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Abstract
Far-right extremism is a growing problem in the United States. Attacks by radical right
organizations are increasing and represent a significant portion of all domestic terror incidents.
However, current approaches to deal with far-right extremism are failing and require a different
approach to address this problem. A potential solution to stymie future attacks would be to shift
the way that police departments are conducting their operations. A community-oriented policing
(COP) strategy would allow law enforcement to target extremists in a way that fosters positive
relationships with communities as well as gain critical intelligence and insight into these radical
movements. This paper develops the foundations for future research by examining a foreign COP
program that could serve as a model for a U.S.-based COP program. In addition, this paper
investigates the costs and benefits of shifting to a COP strategy.
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Introduction
On August 12th, 2017, white supremacists, militia groups, and various other extremist
organizations gathered in Charlottesville, Virginia in an attempt to unite the white nationalist
movement and protest the removal of confederate statues (Thompson, Winston & Graham,
2017). It drew hundreds of counter-protestors from evangelical groups, civil rights groups and
anti-fascist groups. The event turned deadly as James Fields (alleged to be aligned with white
supremacist groups) rammed his vehicle into the surrounding crowd, injuring dozens of people
and resulting in the death of Heather Heyer (Thompson, Winston & Graham, 2017).
Representing the largest public gathering of far-right extremists in decades, the “Unite the Right”
rally was a visible representation of the size and strength of the far-right movement in the United
States. The rally drew national headlines and attention to far-right extremist activities, which are
on the rise across the nation (Bergen et. al, 2018; Jones, 2018; Parkin et. al, 2017). Due to its
domestic nature, police departments have a vital role in combatting this trend and must find
innovative ways to adapt to this growing threat. In light of this, this paper prescribes communityoriented policing (COP) as a potential strategy for police departments in their pursuit to tackle
far-right extremism. For the purposes of this paper, far-right extremism encompasses movements
that are rooted in white supremacist ideology (e.g. neo-Nazis), as well as anti-government
sentiments (e.g. sovereign citizens) (Anti-Defamation League, n.d.)
The Rising Threat of Far-Right Extremism
Before the September 11th attacks, police departments paid minimal attention to
terrorism, believing it to be a “remote possibility” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, p.4).
However, once the attacks occurred, police departments radically redirected their focus to
prioritize counter-terrorism operations in a concentrated nationwide effort to prevent future terror
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attacks (Byman, 2018). They poured significant resources and expertise into upgrading
intelligence capabilities, employing complex detection technologies, incorporating militarygrade equipment and more (Rizer & Hartman, 2011). However, many argue that a
disproportionate amount of resources has been diverted to combating international jihadi
terrorism (Byman, 2018). This has been compounded by the Trump administration’s policy
decisions to focus exclusively on combating Islamic extremism (Ainsely, Cooke, & Volz, 2017).
These policy decisions have resulted in a substantial gap in law enforcement’s ability to combat
domestic, far-right terrorism (German & Robinson, 2018).
This lack of attention on domestic terrorism is unjustified and mistaken, considering the
consistent increase of domestic terror incidents. According to data compiled by the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) [2017, p.5],
between 2000 and 2016, there was a “sharp increase in the proportion of attacks carried out by
right-wing extremists (from 6% to 35%).” This is supported by data collected from the AntiDefamation League (2017), showing that far-right terror incidents are increasing and near peak
levels (see Figure 1). Although jihadi-inspired attacks represent the largest proportion of terrorist
attacks in the United States, the mere fact that far-right terrorism has been a growing trend
should be a cause for concern. The evidence is clear—the number of far-right attacks have been
increasing and will likely continue to increase due to a variety of factors. In particular, the
growth of social media allows different organizations to coordinate and use recruits and funds in
innovative ways (START 2017, Jones, 2018; Parkin et. al, 2017). Seeing that far-right extremism
is a growing domestic problem, it is essential to encourage the participation of law enforcement
in addressing it. Police departments must be encouraged and enabled to devote appropriate
resources in response to this urgent threat.
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To effectively combat far-right terrorism, law enforcement needs to undergo a
reorientation surrounding police practices. Due to the overwhelming focus on combating
international terrorism, police departments often have few resources (if any) to devote to
combating far-right terrorism, rendering it a low priority issue (German & Robinson, 2018). The
Trump administration’s decision to nullify, delay, and significantly reduce grants to combat farright extremism compounds this imbalance (Ainsely, Cooke, & Volz, 2017); it is now far more
difficult for departments to collaborate with third-party organizations (Zanona, 2017).
Furthermore, officers often lack the necessary training to identify and respond to extremism.
According to investigative journalism conducted by ProPublica, very few police departments
teach new recruits about hate crimes, and those that do teach them in a cursory manner (2017).
However, even with few resources and time to dedicate to combating far-right extremism, a
survey of 350 officers representing 175 state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies
conducted by START revealed, “86 percent of respondents agree[d] or strongly agree[d] that
sovereign citizens was a serious terrorist threat” (Rivinius, 2014, p.3). Comparatively, 67 percent
agreed or strongly agreed that Islamic terrorist was a serious terrorism threat. This contrasts with
previous survey data where police officers considered Islamic extremists to pose the greatest
threat to the safety of their communities (see Figure 2). Even though resources are lacking,
police departments are largely aware of the impact of far-right terrorism.
However, the media focuses predominately on international terrorism. According to an
analysis of data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), terror attacks by Muslims received
3.57 times more coverage than non-Muslim terrorists (Kearns, Betus, & Lemieux, 2018). Since
9/11, the perception that Muslims are the greatest terror threat to the United States is ingrained
into the American psyche (Kearns, Betus & Lemieux, 2018). Furthermore, researchers using the
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GTD data argue that events that reflect stereotypes (e.g. all Muslims are terrorists) are
newsworthy because they confirm pre-existing biases. This is reflected by the media’s hesitancy
to label offenders like Dylann Roof domestic terrorists, out of fear of backlash from conservative
observers (Reitman, 2018). The media’s heavy focus on Islamic terrorism shapes public opinion,
making it harder to persuade policymakers that far-right extremism is a serious threat. These
complex factors compound and have contributed to how police shape their practices, preventing
action to tackle far-right extremism.
Community-Oriented Policing as a General Policing Strategy
In defining COP, there exists much variation between police departments, and a single
definition that encapsulates it remains a challenge. Yet, the U.S. Department of Justice definition
best captures the general description of COP:
Community policing focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of police
services that includes aspects of traditional law enforcement, as well as prevention,
problem-solving, community engagement, and partnerships. The community policing
model balances reactive responses to calls for service with proactive problem-solving
centered on the causes of crime and disorder. Community policing requires police and
citizens to join together as partners in the course of both identifying and effectively
addressing these issues (Fisher-Stewart, p.4, 2007)
COP involves a merger of traditional law enforcement tactics (such as foot patrols) with
unconventional methods like hosting canine shows, participating in public forums with local
leaders, eating at local food establishments, and generally increasing officer-to-community
communication. These are typically “quality of life” improvements and may appear to be of low
priority to police officers (in comparison to investigating violent crimes) but are hugely
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important for community members (Kurzman et. al, 2016). There have been empirical examples
to support the success of COP, evidenced by experiments conducted in Chicago and Seattle that
improved the citizen’s overall quality of life, fostered positive attitudes between the police and
community, and strengthened the perception that crime had decreased (Ferreira, 1996).
However, in terms of dealing with far-right extremism, the application of COP remains
limited. There exists little concrete evidence that COP has been implemented as a tool to respond
to far-right terrorism. A vast number of police departments have shied away from implementing
COP generally, and even fewer apply such strategies in combatting far-right terrorism (Kurzman
et. al, 2016). Nevertheless, the potential for COP to restore the trust of communities in police, as
well as deter and prevent radical far-right extremism, exists. COP would also act as an effective
way to bring parity between police efforts to combat international and domestic terrorism.
Pursuing a COP model can produce a myriad of benefits, such as effectively responding
to far-right extremism (see Figure 3). Critical intelligence is gained when there is a stable
relationship between the community and police (Kurzman et. al, 2016). Investigators are able to
draw upon community resources and expertise to detect potential radicalization (Stohl, 2008).
Additionally, interviews with former police officers report that the public is “the most effective
partner a law enforcement agency has in identifying and apprehending unknown subjects”
(Brown, 2007, p.246). Mutual partnerships foster respect and trust among community members
and the police, most notably by ensuring that communication is open and transparent. That is
necessary to empower community members to voice their concerns about issues as well as refer
other members to police resources (Stohl, 2008). This would be vital in assisting victims of
extremist attacks, since community members could reach out to police if a crime was committed
and seek third party victim assistance programs. Even if COP fails to deter or prevent far-right
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extremism, its victim-centered approach (putting the needs of the victim first) could incur the
benefit of improving relations between the police and the community and bolstering the overall
quality of life in that community (Ferreira, 1996). For example, far-right attacks routinely target
marginalized communities; it stands to reason that a COP strategy would aid these communities
in recovering from those attacks. Moreover, fostering trust between the police and the
community acts as a springboard to further community goals, as well as to strengthening public
safety (Fisher-Stewart, 2007).
In addition to countering domestic terrorism, applying a COP strategy could incur the
ancillary benefit of strengthening other areas of counter-terrorism (Weine, Younis, & Polutnik,
2017). This is (in part) because current efforts of gathering intelligence and engaging in
cooperative practices with Muslim communities are not as effective as they could be, because
those communities are feeling stigmatized (Papatheodorou, 2017). Many Muslim communities
feel that police are unfairly targeting them, feeding into a sense of distrust and an unwillingness
to engage with police. This negatively impacts law enforcements’ ability to form partnerships
with these communities and uncover critical intelligence that could aid in counter-terrorist
operations. Expanding the scope of COP to cover other areas of extremism should reduce this
stigmatization, demonstrating that law enforcement is committed to addressing hate crimes
regardless of who commits them (Papatheodorou, 2017; Weine, Younis, & Polutnik, 2017).
Analysis of the EXIT Programme
Even though examples of COP combating far-right extremism in the U.S. are almost nonexistent, there are examples of successful programs that have been conducted abroad. The most
notable and widespread is the EXIT programme which should serve as a model for future U.S.
COP strategies. Originating during the 1980s in Norway, the Exit Programme was a broad

8

community-oriented strategy developed to respond to the growing threat of Neo-Nazi and
separatists’ movements (Slootman & Tille 2008). An advisory group consisting of experienced
researchers, seasoned police officers, social workers, and other professionals was created to
develop the program. It purposely included a diversity of perspectives to develop nuanced and
deliberate strategies to tackle radicalization. This resulted in a network of different organizations
involved with giving support to youth and parents involved with far-right groups as well as
“developing and disseminating knowledge and methods among professionals who work with
youth from violent groups” (Slootman & Tille 2008, p.158). These partnerships were intended to
support police efforts in areas in which they were not familiar with, such as children’s mental
health.
In terms of how police approached the program, they started by identifying at-risk youth
(primarily aged fourteen) who were poorly educated, impoverished, who previously had a
negative encounter with immigrants, and who are attempting to seek refuge with far-right
extremist groups (Slootman & Tille 2008). These teens were classified as non-violent, having
weak attachments to far-right ideology, and who are seeking guidance from father figures. In
response, police officers under the Exit Programme were instructed to prevent youth from
forming bonds with the extremist groups, in addition to targeting hardened adult members. This
resulted in officers participating in preventive measures such as engaging in local youth clubs,
hosting community forums, and forming genuine bonds with the youth and their parents.
Officers were instructed not to act aggressively towards the youth, nor to use demeaning
language. Instead, they were told to act in positive manner to encourage the youth to be more
cognizant of their decisions, in hopes of diverting them from their current path. For example, a
forty-day dialogue occurred between the police, the Neo-Nazi group Virgrid, and their children,
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which resulted in an exodus of approximately sixty members. Regarding the second aspect of the
Exit Programme, police were instructed to take harsh action towards any hardened adult
extremists that included arresting members even for slight violations. However, officers were
also asked to hold conversations, hoping to reveal to the members the consequences of their
actions. This resulted in numerous far-right extremists leaving their organizations. The
combination of both actions resulted in widespread success, eventually expanding the
programme to Sweden and Germany (Slootman & Tille 2008). Many of these progammes have
proven to be successful and are still in operation (Ramalingam, 2015).
There are a few caveats to consider in terms of whether U.S. police departments could
successfully model the Norwegian Exit Programme. The first and most prominent is that
Norwegian police already operate at a community level, meaning that officers already knew most
of the youth personally (Slootman & Tille 2008). Police officers in the U.S. generally employ a
wide variety of policing measures, such as hot-spot policing or predictive policing, but these
strategies are not intended to foster and maintain stable relations with the community (NIJ,
2017). This lack of existing community relations could stymie the success of COP programs
initially, due to the time it takes to start a COP program (i.e., the training and resources required
to adequately develop positive relations). The second issue is that the Norwegian program
involved significant coordination with a multitude of professionals and non-profit organizations
that specialize in dealing with at-risk youth radicalization. Even if police departments had access
to specialized third parties, many police departments may not have the sufficient resources to
ramp up cooperation and investment (Patil, 2018; Venkatesh, 2012). However, these barriers are
not insurmountable, as they require time and resources, typical of any new policy.
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In sum, the Exit programme reveals the potential for COP success in targeting far-right
extremism. It has empirically reduced the number of extremists and has created positive relations
between the community and the police. The integration of police input along with evidencebased research allows COP models to be tailored to a specific department’s needs and wants.
Although originating in a foreign nation, the Exit programme could, at the very least, provide
key insights into how to develop a U.S. based COP programme.
Obstacles in Using Community-Oriented Policing as a Terrorism Strategy
There remain significant barriers to fully embracing COP as a policing strategy. First,
COP is extremely resource intensive since it requires mutual participation between the police and
the community (Fisher-Stewart, 2007). Encouraging partnerships necessitates event planning,
redefining police procedures, and developing performance standards to ensure cooperation from
officers, in addition to other tedious processes (Spalek, 2012). Hosting events, investing in the
time to foster relationships, and other activities are time-consuming and could detract from other
police work. Additionally, resources from local governments are often diverted from other needs
to create specialized COP officers and fund projects (Fisher-Stewart, 2007). Specialized officers
are one of the more common ways to approach COP, but can be expensive and might make it
difficult to create consistency among officer interactions (i.e., where the same officer speaks to
the same youth). Integrating COP generally (or even using specialized COP officers) could be a
serious obstacle that would require time and effort to overcome – two things not easy to come by
in modern police departments.
The second barrier is motivation from both the police and the community to engage in
COP. The desire from police departments to embrace COP is mixed (Kurzman et.al, 2016).
Reluctance stems from its time-consuming nature, along with the potential for mistakes and
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misunderstanding. Policing is a stressful process, thus attempting to develop genuine
relationships while remaining on guard can often feel overwhelming (Kurzman et. al, 2016).
Compounding that is the ‘us vs. them’ mentality from many police departments that believe that
there is an inherent divide between the police and the community (Murray, 2005). This belief
encourages officers to view the community as separate from them, which creates the conditions
for mutual distrust. If officers are perceived as unwilling to foster genuine relationships with the
community, then partnerships will tend to fall apart, rendering COP ineffective (Fisher-Steward,
2007). On the other hand, if communities are unwilling to form partnerships then police efforts
will be futile. This is true for communities that have had negative past experiences with police,
particularly those that are reclusive and have a genuine distrust towards the police such as
sovereign citizens (Kurzman et. al, 2016).
In addition to internal factors, there are external considerations that need to be addressed
in order to proceed with COP. One consideration would be to determine the types of
communities that police should focus on (i.e., those most worthy of limited time and resources).
For example, communities such as sovereign citizens are inherently hostile to government
agencies and rarely come into contact with police (SPLC, n.d.). These groups are typically
located in exceptionally rural areas because of their extreme unwillingness to cooperate with
police which also poses a risk for unnecessary escalation that could result in injury or death
(Kurzman et. al, 2016). There have been numerous incidents of routine traffic stops involving
sovereign citizens turning deadly (Dickson, 2014). However, as seen in Exit Programme,
building relations with extremist organizations (such as radical skinheads) in a suburban
neighborhood would appear to be a feasible task.
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Another consideration would be to ensure that police are not perceived as being overly
friendly with far-right movements. Hosting community events with people who are known
racists may inflame the general public, since it could be perceived as police departments being
sympathetic to or attempting to curry favor with these organizations. This would be extremely
detrimental, especially given current issues involving police-community relations with minority
communities (Reitman, 2018). Officers cannot afford to lose the confidence of the general
public.
Recommendations
In order to effectively combat far-right extremism in the U.S., police departments should
consider the following recommendations:
•

Selectively Incorporate Community-Oriented Policing: Incorporating COP has
been shown to be a useful way to reduce the risk of radicalization, thus preventing
domestic attacks (Slootman & Tille 2008). Officers have had success using
“canine shows, SWAT team demonstrations, and national night out celebrations”
to persuade far-right groups to abandon their ways (Kurzman et. al, 2016, p.32).
Even if officers are unable to directly form relationships with far-right extremists,
they could form relationships with surrounding community members who could
then give tips and inform the police of suspicious activity. However, due to
limited time and resources, police departments are not likely capable of using
COP as a strategy for every type of far-right extremist group. Decentralized farright groups, with members geographically located in suburban areas, are easier to
form partnerships with than extremists that are located in extremely rural areas
(e.g. sovereign citizens). Additionally, it would be a waste of valuable resources
13

to devote time and effort to groups that are too radical to form stable partnerships
with (such as the Oath Keepers, a notorious anti-government organization)
(SPLC, n.d). The determination would be up to local police departments, since
they could make the most accurate analysis of their surrounding communities.
Regarding funding, departments could overcome this barrier if they were to seek
grants from organizations such as the Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services. Furthermore, it could be speculated that success breeds success,
therefore if a program was shown to be effective in combating far-right terrorism
or in restoring community relations even partially, it could prove to be an impetus
for the government to devote more resources to COP there and elsewhere.
•

Create Motivational Opportunities for Officers: As identified earlier, one
barrier to the implementation of COP programs can be a lack of motivation on
behalf of police officers to foster relations with the community and participate in
events (Kurzman et. al, 2016). Therefore, to foster an environment where officers
want to implement COP, police departments ought to find ways to incentivize
officer participation. Police officers who choose to engage in community events
should be rewarded with stipends, promotions, and/or other benefits. Furthermore,
empirical studies have shown that officers engaged in COP are more satisfied
with their jobs than officers engaged in crime-controlled policing (Halsted,
Bromley, Cochran, 2000; Green, 1989). Therefore, even if officers are initially
hesitant to engage in COP, as time passes they will be more likely to appreciate
the work that they are doing and thus will support initiatives to foster relations
with the community.
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•

Develop Specialized Training and Awareness Curriculums: Consistent
throughout the literature has been an emphasis on utilizing training and awareness
programs to facilitate effective communication between police and the
community. Training programs must be clear, concise, unbiased, non-ideological,
and based on empirical evidence. This is to ensure that officers are retaining
information and also to avoid making officers feel like their personal beliefs are
being attacked, which is especially true for regions such as the South where
officers have a greater tendency to reject applying the terrorism label to certain
extremist groups, particularly radical anti-abortionists (Kurzman et. al, 2016).
Thus, it is vital to train officers to separate any sympathy with the terrorist
organization’s beliefs from the organization’s commission of actual criminal acts
(Chermak, Freilich, & Shemtob, 2009). Resources are available from the AntiDefamation League and the Southern Poverty Law Center that could help in
developing programs.

•

Upgrade and Monitor Intelligence Capabilities: As a prerequisite to effective
COP, police departments must have sufficient intelligence to identify who lives in
what communities (Kurzman et. al, 2016). If a police officer cannot identify a
community member (and whether or not they belong to a far-right organization),
then how can they deter or prevent far-right extremism from occurring? Thus,
departments should make a greater effort to track and record members of
extremist groups, including working with researchers and other government
agencies to coordinate data. This could include simple observations such as
noticing the terminology used by a community member (e.g. the use of the phrase
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“sovereign citizen”) as well as viewing signs and bumper stickers that could
indicate ideology. Departments could incorporate the use of informants, a strategy
that has shown to be effective in some situations, such as the arrests of the
Washington State Militia in the 1990s (Chermak, Freilich, & Shemtob, 2009).
Departments should also use informal word of mouth to identify relationships in
the community.
Alternatives to Community-Oriented Policing
As with any policy problem, there are a variety of different methods to solve the issue.
For example, some experts have argued that current laws are insufficient to deal with domestic
terrorism, and instead new laws need to be created (McCord, 2018). This could be in the form of
a statute directly criminalizing domestic terrorism, yet there already exists a robust legal
framework that can be employed. 1 Furthermore, the creation of such a statute could undermine
civil liberties and adversely target nonviolent protestors (German and Robinson, 2018); there is
evidence that federal law enforcement officers target left-leaning activists such as
environmentalists protesting the construction of new pipelines or political protesters that argue
for an end to police brutality (German, 2018).
Another option would be for police to adopt a more aggressive approach, similar to “zero
tolerance” policing that seeks to crack down on far-right extremists. However, such an approach
has previously resulted in backlash that emboldened far-right groups (Reitman, 2018). For
example, former secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano developed
a comprehensive report in partnership with the FBI, detailing the growing threat from far-right

Prosecutors do not charge suspected terrorists with the crime “domestic terrorism” but rather employ a variety of
different laws that target the method and motive. This could include conspiracy to commit murder, murder,
racketeering, the unlawful possession of a firearm, hate crime laws and more (German, 2018).
1
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extremism (Reitman, 2018). Unfortunately, that document was leaked to conservative radio hosts
and anti-government organizations, who encouraged a rally of support from far-right groups,
arguing that the government was plotting against conservatives. In addition, it is highly possible
that aggressive policing toward extremist factions would result in negative counteractions that
could incur more police deaths. There have been multiple documented incidents of routine traffic
stops turning violent due to sovereign citizens rejecting police legitimacy (Dickson, 2014).
Encouraging police to conduct aggressive policing in routine situations such as these could incite
further violence. Furthermore, aggressive tactics would likely involve SWAT units and other
forms of militarized policing. This is problematic, as there is evidence that militarized policing
not only fails to reduce crime or provide increased safety, it incurs negative reactions from the
public (Mummol, 2018). Observing military-like police vehicles in local neighborhoods gives
the perception of an authoritarian police presence, diminishing community-police relations.
Conclusion
This paper provides a foundation for future COP researchers to use, but there remains
much more to learn about COP’s role in combatting domestic terrorism. Future research could
expand upon the intricacies of developing a counter-terrorism specific COP program, perhaps in
collaboration with a specific police department (e.g., New York City’s Police Department, which
has implemented multiple efforts that could be considered part of a COP strategy) (NYPD, n.d.).
As discussed, COP could allow police departments to start focusing on the root causes of
extremism while avoiding other alternatives that would produce more harm than good. From
Charlottesville to the more recent Pittsburgh synagogue shooting, far-right terror attacks are
growing. Action must be taken, and COP could be effective in diverting at-risk youth from being
recruited as well as intervening to prevent adult members from committing future crimes. Even if
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COP fails as a preventative strategy, it would at least be a step forward in remedying to the
current distrust that exists between police and the community (Papatheodorou, 2017).
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Appendix

Far-Right Terror Incidents in the United States (19932016)
30
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2011-2013

2014-2016

Number of Far-Right Terror Incidents

Figure 1. Far-Right Terror Incidents in the United States
Source: Anti-Defamation League (2017). This data consisted of acts, attempted acts, plots of deadly
terrorist incidents (i.e., incidents where someone was injured or killed), and non-deadly terror incidents
over a 23-year period.
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Police Perceptions of Terrorist Threats
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Figure 2. Police Perceptions of Terrorist Threats
Source: START (2017). This survey consisted of 350 officers representing 175 state, local and tribal law
enforcement agencies and compared the results from a 2006-2007 survey to a 2013-2014 survey (both
conducted by START). The left axis represents a mean score of a 4-point scale (1=strongly disagree to
4=strongly agree) and the (rank order) of officer concerns (Rivinius, 2014).
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Figure 3. The potential benefits of a community-oriented policing strategy geared towards
combating far-right extremism
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